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The origin of mitochondria was a major evolutionary transition
leading to eukaryotes, and is a hotly debated issue. It is unknown
whether mitochondria were acquired early or late, and whether it
was captured via phagocytosis or syntrophic integration. We pre-
sent dynamical models to directly simulate the emergence of mito-
chondria in an ecoevolutionary context. Our results show that
regulated farming of prey bacteria and delayed digestion can facil-
itate the establishment of stable endosymbiosis if prey-rich and
prey-poor periods alternate. Stable endosymbiosis emerges without
assuming any initial metabolic benefit provided by the engulfed
partner, in a wide range of parameters, despite that during good
periods farming is costly. Our approach lends support to the appear-
ance of mitochondria before any metabolic coupling has emerged,
but after the evolution of primitive phagocytosis by the urkaryote.
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Mitochondria provide eukaryotic cells with energy throughefficient oxygen respiration. They are endosymbiotic de-
scendants of once free-living alphaproteobacteria (1, 2). The
origin of this endosymbiosis remains unclear because initial ad-
vantages of the association are debatable (for an extensive re-
view, see ref. 3) and we do not know whether mitochondria are
early or late partners of the eukaryotic host cell (4–6). Arguably,
the origin of the eukaryotic cell is the biggest major transition in
the history of life, and also a major transition in individuality (7,
8). Besides the acquisition of mitochondria, which proved to be
extremely effective partners in the long term, radical changes
happened in many aspects of the host (e.g., cell structures, in-
heritance mechanisms, and their coordination) relative to what
we see in the prokaryotic ancestors. Such a major transition
cannot be selectively neutral: thousands of positive mutations
must have been selected for, leading to the complex eukaryotic
cell that the last eukaryotic common ancestor (LECA) was (9,
10). Out of the many steps of the transition, we focus only on the
merger (the integration of mitochondria in the archaeal host),
without discussing much of the preceding or succeeding steps. The
question naturally arises: What are the benefits of the eukaryotic
condition and the merger? Essentially, there are two answers, and
both assume markedly different initial conditions and timings for
mitochondria to join the party.
The traditional answer for the benefit of eukaryotes is pre-
dation by phagocytosis that would have considerably increased
the efficiency relative to any bacterial predation (with external
digestion) (11, 12). The benefit in this case is the energy saved
for processes other than the synthesis of many organic compounds.
Although the phagocytotic machinery and its functioning demand
energy, (secondarily) amitochondriate eukaryotes, once termed
Archezoa (13), are phagocytosing without mitochondria. Note,
however, that lack of evidence is not the evidence of lack; the re-
cently discovered Asgard archaea (14) show signs of a cytoskeleton.
Mitochondria, in this scenario, were acquired phagocytotically, and
provided photosynthates for the host to help survive hard times.
The hypothesis rival to ancestral predation is the energetic
boost provided by ancient mitochondria to the evolving host cell
(15–17). Because the Archezoan lifestyle exists, the claim has
been made that not this condition as such but the evolutionary
process leading to it would have required the energetic boost by
mitochondria (18). The ancestral eukaryotic lineage is supposed
to have experimented with a large combinatorial library of new
and costly proteins that might have required up to 100,000 genes
per cell (16). No model or any comparative evidence has been
offered to support this claim (3). Mitochondria undoubtedly
provided an energetic boost to the evolving host cell, but this
benefit could only be harvested after the establishment of the
adenine nucleotide translocator (ANT), a eukaryotic invention
(19) that taps into the symbionts ATP pool. What may have been
the benefit to partners before the translocator was in place?
Here we entertain the possibility that phagocytosis evolved in
the host archaeon. Several facts support this, at least weakly, in
modern Archaea: actin and tubulin homologs (20, 21), primitive
cytoskeletal features (20, 22), membrane remodeling (23, 24),
signs of possible earlier endosymbiosis (25), and even possibly
phagocytosis in the archaeal host (14). For symbiosis, or at least
a mutually beneficial relationship to develop, the bacterial partner
had to evade digestion.
But this raises a problem: Why would indigestion have been
beneficial without any direct profit for the host? This is further
complicated by the fact that eating less (relative to well-fed
competitors) would have meant an immediate disadvantage. More
than 20 y ago it was suggested that perhaps the ancient hosts kept
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prey bacteria as humans keep pigs (8): they feed them during easy
times and eat them during hard times (a bet-hedging strategy) (26).
Similar exploitative behavior was observed in the Paramecium–
Chlorella endosymbiosis (27). The critical feasibility condition of
the proposed scenario is phagocytosis before endosymbiosis, rather
than the other way around. Given the fact that members of the
recently established but ultrastructurally still-unexplored Asgard
archaeal superphylum has genes for cytoskeletal processes and
vesicle transport (14), we do not consider early phagocytosis, be-
fore mitochondria, unrealistic. In this case, because the host was
already predatory, the only benefit for the host cell compared with
nonprovisioning phagocytotic predators was the prey stock avail-
able during hard times.
In this paper we show by explicit modeling that the farming
scenario is a viable route to protomitochondrial establishment:
farming by regulated internal digestion could have led to stable en-
dosymbiosis without any other benefit (such as ATP or other meta-
bolic currency from the symbiont) in an environment alternating
between rich and poor in prey bacteria. We present an analytical
minimum model of farming and a more comprehensive, but con-
sonant, individual-based model. Each model investigates how two
types of phagocytotic predatory archaea, one conventional (non-
farmer) and one capable of storing prey for delayed digestion (farmer),
compete in an ecological-evolutionary setup. This is a unique and
ecologically explicit dynamical model of the establishment phase of
the prokaryote-to-eukaryote major transition.
Results
To help the reader, we briefly introduce both models before
results are discussed. Detailed explanations are in Materials and
Methods and in SI Appendix; a list of all figures and experiments
are provided in SI Appendix, Table S2 with parameter values in
SI Appendix, Table S3.
Analytical Minimum Model of Farming. The ecological model sim-
ulates the dynamical behavior of farmer and nonfarmer species,
assuming a fluctuating resource, causing rich and poor environments.
In rich periods, both species grow exponentially, but farmers have a
fitness disadvantage (reduced growth rate constant) as farm main-
tenance inflicts a cost. In poor environments, both species decline,
but the farmer has a delayed decline due to its provisions provided
by the farm. The longer the poor period is, the closer the farmer’s
death rate gets to that of the nonfarmer.
Farmers are introduced in small amounts to a nonfarmer pop-
ulation; the time evolution of dynamics are presented in Fig. 1B.
The ratio of farmers to nonfarmers (zN) after N resource-rich and
resource-poor periods indicates that the farmer population can
successfully invade a nonfarmer population if the resource-poor
period tD is longer than the rich period tG (D and G represent
decline and growth; Fig. 1A). The longer the poor period is, the
more fitness disadvantages farmers can tolerate in good periods.
These disadvantages stem from the diminished per-capita repro-
duction rate b (compared with nonfarmer’s reproduction rate a).
Fig. 1. (A) Equilibrium distribution of invading farmers. Colored points indicate cases where farming cells (y) dominate over nonfarmers (x) after N= 100
cycles of rich–poor periods. Color indicates the logarithm of the ratio zN = y=x; points are not shown where logðzNÞ< 0 (farmer is practically extinct). Pa-
rameters: fzð0Þ= 0.1, v = 10, tG = v − tD,d = 0.3, r = 0.3, a= 1, k=200g. (B) Time evolution of farmers invading nonfarmer population. Mutant (farmer) is in-
troduced at tinv = 70with amount yðtinvÞ= 1. Calculated by numerical integration of Eq. 1 for rich and Eq. 3 for poor periods; the successive yðtÞ and xðtÞ values
can also be calculated by the analytical solutions for the corresponding differential equations (these are used to calculate zN; SI Appendix). Parameters:
fx0 = 10, y0 = 0, tG = 5, tD = 10,d0 = 0.01,d = 0.3, r = 0.3, a= 1,b= 0.8, k= 200g, 16 cycles of rich–poor period pairs; shading indicates poor periods. Results are
similar with random period lengths (SI Appendix, Figs. S2 and S3). (C) Adaptive dynamics of invading farmers. Successive farmer mutants can invade a
nonfarmer population only if parameters b (intrinsic growth rate) and r (delayed decline by farming) are in trade-off: if r decreases (better delay of death in
poor periods), b must also decrease (worse growth in good periods). There exist viable evolutionary trajectories toward establishing farming. Parameters:
fd = 0.3,d0 = 0.01, k= 200, tG = 5, tD = 15, σb = σr = 0.01, σtG = σtD = 0.6g; mutant is introduced after two rich–poor cycles. For further details, see SI Appendix.
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To investigate evolution, we have explored the adaptive dy-
namics of the model (Fig. 1C). Results show that invading
populations of more evolved farming ability (delayed starvation
due to farming) successively replace residents, ultimately elimi-
nating nonfarmer behavior (assuming the intrinsic growth rate b
is in tradeoff with the delay rate of starvation r; otherwise, the
result would be trivial). If r decreases (better delayed starvation
in poor times), bmust also decrease (worse growth in rich times),
which is a realistic biological condition. If this holds, most evo-
lutionary trajectories lead to the strong attractor of small instead
of high r,b values (SI Appendix, Fig. S4). In other words, the
longer starvation is delayed in poor periods (small r), the smaller
intrinsic growth rate farmers can tolerate in good periods (small
b), indicating that farming is sustainable.
Farming, Fusion, and Fission. We have investigated whether sex
(iterated fusion–fission) of the archaeal cells have any effect on
the population. We show both via a continuous time and a game
theoretical model, that farmers always have an advantage. We
assume that, during fusion–fission of host cells, farmed bacteria
are exchanged via passive cytoplasmic diffusion, which, if infinite
time is allotted for fusion, results in equalized stock sizes where
each party donates half of its stock to the other. Nonfarmers
cannot pursue an active “stealing” strategy (anything that would
bias passive diffusion toward receiving more than half of the
partner’s stock) because that would require highly evolved cyto-
skeletal gymnastics. In this case, because nonfarmer and farmer
stock levels would converge only in infinite time, nonfarmers could
never win. There is a critical time t^ when farmers have more stock
on average than nonfarmers in the poor period, assuming non-
farmers can obtain a fraction s=½ of farmer stock:
t^=
ln

f0
«

q+ π
,
where q is the rate of stock elimination (culling), π is the prob-
ability that farmers and nonfarmers fuse, f0 is the stock level of
farmers at the start of the poor period, and « is an arbitrary small
number specifying the threshold of convergence of stock levels of
farmers and nonfarmers). It ensures that the evolutionarily sta-
ble strategy is farming and not stealing.
Individual-Based Computational Model. The above minimum model
deliberately neglects several component processes (Fig. 2 and SI
Appendix, Table S1). To provide a more realistic case, we have
constructed an individual-based, stochastic, model in discrete
time where internal cell states (cell and farm sizes), interactions
(eating, farming, and division), and costs are explicitly modeled.
Farmer and nonfarmer cells compete in a closed Moran process
for prey species. The prey population regenerates at every time
step according to the fluctuation of the abiotic resource causing
poor and rich periods. Predators capture prey and, according to
their evolutionary traits of culling and farming, eat them or store
them for later use. Culling the farm happens in a piecemeal
fashion. When fed, host cells grow and divide when they reach a
certain size. The explicit cost of farm using up host’s resources is
realized in negative host growth (dependent on farm size).
Farmers also suffer an implicit cost of farming because they
cannot store and cull in the same time step, modeling increased
handling time. The farm itself can also grow autonomously,
depending on the availability of the abiotic resource.
Results are consistent with those of the minimal model: farmers
can invade without extra benefit of their symbionts if environment
fluctuates (Fig. 3 B and C). Farmer invasion is possible (and likely)
whenever there is reduced mortality (or increased growth rate) for
the farmers in poor periods. Moreover, farmers can invade in a
wide range of the parameters (Fig. 3A).
Farming ability first appears by mutation, and farmers initiate
their farm by storing prey. After this, the farm is increased mostly
by its own growth. According to our results, this has the following
consequences. First, the host evolves toward culling more and
more of its farm, even in good times, maximizing the culling rate,
to keep up with nonfarmers (SI Appendix, Figs. S9C and S10C).
Second, because further storing to the farm is marginal to its own
growth, the allocation ability can be entirely lost (SI Appendix,
Figs. S9B and S10B). It only makes sense to maintain the
mechanism if the farm can be lost due to culling, and it must be
regained after a long resource-poor period (as farming eukary-
otes do) (28, 29). Results prove that this is indeed the case (SI
Appendix, Figs. S9B and S10B). At any point, nonfarmers cannot
invade, due to the still-existent environmental fluctuations that
favor farmers with provisions in poor periods (SI Appendix,
Fig. S9A).
Ultimately, we allowed evolution to turn explicit farming cost
to benefit, mimicking the invention of ANT or other means by
which a symbiont could provide metabolic help (this benefit,
dependent on farm size, is above the implicit benefit of providing
provisions). The cost of farming is assumed to decrease most
slowly during evolution; otherwise the result is trivial, because
turning any cost to benefit is an obviously adaptive step, and
farmers would easily win. Even with slowest mutation rate
(compared with storing and culling), cost will turn to benefit.
Although this is trivial, we were interested in whether a large
enough explicit benefit can cause the host to abandon culling for
good. Results prove that this is possible: when explicit benefit is
at least four times the unit gained from eating a single prey,
culling rate can be reduced to zero (SI Appendix, Figs. S12D and
S13). This proves that there is a viable evolutionary route from
predation through farming to metabolic coupling.
Fig. 2. Predator–prey interactions in the farming archaeon and interactions
in the individual-based model. Free living prey bacteria (blue cells) have
density A that is explicitly defined by the abiotic resource density R (1).
Predatory archaeon capable of farming (red cell) captures prey (2). The
predator either consumes the captured prey to fuel its growth (3) or store
prey in the farm (farming, 4) that has density B. Stored living cells can also be
digested by the host to grow (culling, 5) which eventually leads to the re-
production of the host (6). Stored bacteria can also reproduce within the
host depending on resource R (7). Bacteria multiply in separate phagosomes
(red wrappers). Farmed cells could escape the host (8) to reseed environ-
ments where prey species have been extinct (omitted in the model). Pred-
ators unable to maintain a farm (nonfarmers) lack processes 4, 5, 7, and 8;
predators unable to cull their farm lack 5. Any explicit benefit the farm
provides for the host (metabolites, energy) is not displayed; if there is no
explicit benefit, hosted bacteria are parasites.
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Discussion
We have found in both the analytical and the computational
models that no explicit benefit is required from the partners for a
stable integration to evolve, provided parties receive implicit
benefit (food for the host and shelter for the symbiont in poor
times). Farming is a form of bet hedging: the host applies dif-
ferent strategies in good and hard times to minimize its overall
risk of extinction. In consequence, relative fitness becomes
higher in poor environments and overall temporal variance of
fitness is reduced in expense of reduced fitness in rich environ-
ments (26). Although no examples of bet hedging are known in
Archaea, it is prevalent and well documented in Bacteria and
Eukarya. Because there is no need to assume any further metabolic
interaction, our bet-hedging strategy can explain stable integration
of endosymbiont with host without preexisting metabolic coupling.
Given that in both of our models, there is a wide range of param-
eters where farmers can spread and dominate the population, we
claim that ours is a general result that could explain many cases
of evolution towards stable endosymbiosis.
Whereas neither phagocytotic archaea nor endosymbionts in
archaea are known (30) [the association of haloarchaean genes
with a hypothetical early bacterial endosymbiont (31) seems to
be an artifact (32)], recall that no intermediate of any stage to-
ward eukaryotes is known (neither mitochondriate prokaryotes
nor primarily amitochondriate eukaryotes are known to exist). It
is obvious, however, that some must have existed. An early ap-
pearance of phagocytosis in Archaea is increasingly, albeit as yet
inconclusively, supported by finding the necessary components
(14, 20–24). Assumption of phagocytosis implies that the farming
strategy can be applied to the establishment of mitochondria.
What makes our models specific to mitochondrial origins are
(i) the complete lack of any preexisting metabolic interaction or
preadaptation (that could provide any explicit benefit) that are
certainly there in any modern eukaryote harboring endosymbi-
onts; (ii) the lack of synchronized cell cycles for host and sym-
biont; (iii) phagocytosis; and (iv) farming and delayed digestion
of the farm. Consequently, the lack of relevant examples makes it
very hard to estimate parameter values for an association that
occurred ∼1–2 Ga ago (33). If the host was increased in size
(required for effective phagocytosis), it is not unreasonable to
assume an internal endosymbiotic population size in the order of
102–103 [e.g., in ciliates (34); modern amoeba might contain as
many as 106 (35)]. Some Korarchaea and Thaumarchaea (in fact
in symbiosis with epibiotic bacteria) can reach sizes of 10–100 μm
(36). For a detailed explanation on our parameter choices, see SI
Appendix, Parameterization.
An analogy of our proposed mechanism lies in the farming
behavior of Dictyostelium discoidum. Some clones of this slime
mold can establish a symbiosis with members of the Burkholderia
bacterial genus. By incorporating the bacteria in the fruiting body
instead of eating them all (prudent predation), the amoebae can
ensure that the germinating spores find themselves equipped with
edible food in a nutrient-poor medium (28). The bacteria can
confer the farming behavior on the amoebae (29). Remarkably,
another bacterium, Pseudomonas fluorescens is also associated
with this phenomenon with two different strains: one is inedible
but produces useful small molecules to the farmers (and possibly
harmful to nonfarmers) and the other one is edible. The differ-
ence between the two strains is caused by a mutation in a regu-
latory gene (37). A recent experimental paper (27) also shows
that full exploitation is a feasible route to the establishment of
endosymbiosis (among eukaryotic partners). In the Paramecium–
Chlorella symbiosis, the algal partner never gains net benefit from
endosymbiosis, whereas the ciliate host benefits from engulfed
algae under high light irradiance, and suffers from a cost in dim
light. This seems to be the closest analogy to the interim evolutionary
phase considered here. Taken together, these farming phenomena
support our scenario for mitochondrial origins, with the caveat that
living examples always involve highly evolved eukaryotic hosts. They
also prompt us to hypothesize that some extra benefits (not con-
sidered in our model, such as resistance against other bacteria) may
have provided advantage to host cells even when eating of ingested
prey would have been still inefficient.
Fig. 3. Invasion of farmers in the evolutionary individual-based model. (A) Equilibrium populations where farmers win. Colored points represent equilibrium
populations where the relative farmer ratio is above 1/2 (after 107 time steps, 1,000 rich–poor cycles with period length v = 10,000, each point is an average of
10 independent simulations). Each simulation started from a pure nonfarmer population with farming mutation rate μf = 0.05 and culling mutation rate μh = 0.05.
To comply with the assumption that no explicit benefit can be expected from the symbiont ab initio, farm cost was not allowed to evolve and turn to benefit.
Farmers can set aside prey (with probability rate f > 0), but it is costly to do so (c< 0). tD=v is the ratio of the poor period in a rich–poor period cycle; c is the cost of
farming; Rmin is equivalent to the minimum of prey density in poor periods. (B) Characteristic run where farmer population wins over nonfarmer
{c=−0.1,Rmin = 0, tD = 0.7vg. (C) Simulation of B in longer time span. Prey density is omitted; blue shading indicates position of B.
4 of 7 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1718707115 Zachar et al.
A serious problem of farming is divisional dilution: even in
good times (when the farm is not supposed to be culled), the
actual farm size will reduce in successive divisions, unless
something counters it. (This is even more pronounced in case of
nonsynchronous host and symbiont cell cycles.) Storing more
prey does not help; it reduces the relative reproduction rate of
farmers compared with nonfarmers because farmers can eat less
in unit time (see above). The only factor that can counter divisional
dilution at the start of the partnership is autonomous growth of the
farm (SI Appendix, Fig. S11). Accordingly, the farm’s ability to
grow inside the host must have been paramount in countering
occasional culling and halving at every division (in the minimal
model, this is implicitly assumed). Furthermore, farmed bacteria
directly depend on the external resource (i.e., the environment),
so in poor periods they can only grow very slowly (or not at all).
Therefore, the farm will not last indefinitely in poor times because
the host will ultimately consume faster than it can grow. If the poor
period is any longer than the provisions, it means a death sentence
for farmers (even if nonfarmers have already been starved to
death). Thus, farmers must balance between building up a farm,
paying costs, and competing with nonfarmers in good periods, and
rationing their farms in poor periods such that in the long run they
outperform nonfarmers.
To model a worst-case scenario, we deliberately implied costs
on everything the farmer does to prevent any trivial advantage
over nonfarmers, so as not to beg the question. Farming has an
explicit cost, dependent on farm size, that the host must pay in
the form of reduced growth. Furthermore, we also added an
implicit cost of farming: farmers cannot store and cull in the
same time step (modeling increased handling time). Because any
food stored is not consumed right away, it means that farming
equals giving up eating. This ensures that farming is not a zero-
sum process and has a disadvantage in good periods: farmers grow
less in unit time compared with nonfarmers (even if farming has
zero explicit cost). Consequently, farmers must have superior re-
productive rates compared with nonfarmers in poor environments,
otherwise they will go extinct or cannot invade. This is achieved by
delaying death in poor periods (or even being able to reproduce in
the individual-based model) when nonfarmers simply starve. Thus,
according to our models, hosts do not receive free lunch; never-
theless, protomitochondria are able to stably integrate.
In our model, captured bacteria end up enclosed in the host’s
phagosome, just like in real and laboratory conditions (35)
(though this is not always the case; see ref. 34). Wrapping sym-
bionts in a phagosomal membrane has consequences. It might
limit the symbiont metabolism if it relies on extensive transport
of large molecules. However, this does not seem to be a problem
if the symbiont is phototrophic (as we assume). Many modern
examples attest to this, most prominently the various plastids,
which sometimes retain extra membranes. Although losing the
phagosomal membrane could have been a late invention (fol-
lowed by the integration of ANT), the reproduction of symbionts
within a phagosome provides a natural solution as to how they
could have ended up in the host’s cytoplasm: the phagosome
simply burst due to overpopulation. No phagosomal remnants
can be found around modern mitochondria, whose outer mem-
brane is partly of bacterial origin.
The most important consequence of the phagosomal membrane
is, however, that the symbiont could only reproduce clonally.
Unless the host was sexual (discussed later), the symbiont is also
exclusive to the host’s lineage. As a result, the symbiont genome
becomes closely linked with the host’s genome, even before nu-
clear transfer of any genes. In the individual-based model, we
assume asexual hosts. We also associate the farming ability with
the host’s genome (instead of the symbionts), as is the case with
Dictyostelium, where carrying a farm is a clone-specific trait (28).
Consequently, all evolutionary traits presently associated with the
asexual host could equally be associated with its clonal symbiont,
i.e., the farm allocation rate of the host could in fact be the
digestion-evasion rate of the symbiont. The evolved trait of culling
can thus be interpreted as the ability to slowly overcome this
evasive strategy. If, however, bacteria can evade host’s digestion,
nonfarmers lacking the culling ability can end up with internal
bacteria that only imply costs and do not provide any benefit. This
would be a parasitic scenario.
Although the above argument holds, ancient Archaea might
have practiced sex and fused to share genes and farms. Eury- and
Crenarchaeota are known to undergo fusion and fission (38, 39).
We presented a simple game theoretical model that nevertheless
captures the essence of the situation. Assuming that fusion is
triggered by starvation, we find that farmer–farmer interactions
are less critical because nonfarmers can practically “steal” part of
the stock when fusing (and splitting) with farmers. We show that
nonfarmers can never build up stock larger than farmers if diffusion
is responsible for exchange. In other words, farmers in the poor
period always have more stock than nonfarmers, which maintains
their selective advantage (in terms of survival) in poor times. There
are other important considerations that favor farmers in the long-
term. Repeated fusion–fission is costly (draining stocks), and leads
to selective death of those running out of their reserves. Re-
morseless decline in population density entails an Allee effect that
favors farmers: as densities drop (there is no reproduction in the
poor period), mating probability (also of farmers and nonfarmers)
decreases hyperbolically. Ultimately, internal stock levels will de-
cide who survives the poor period and in what density. That is,
farmers must maintain a farm large enough to survive the poor
period with an end period density that prohibits nonfarmers to
outgrow them in the following good period.
Furthermore, if members of the farm can occasionally escape
the host (not modeled), farmers can (re)colonize habitats where
prey is missing (like Dictyostelium does) (28). Consequently, farm
escape, or other means that facilitate farm-sharing, renders the
prey as a public good in poor times (and farming/seeding ability a
useful asset in the population), which minimizes risk for all pop-
ulation members, thus stabilizing the overall population. We have
not modeled this, but the effect was proven in a eukaryotic ex-
ample (40). Because rare escape of farmed bacteria is enough to
reseed habitats and has only a marginal cost, we believe that this
beneficial mechanism could have been additional to provisioning.
There also seems to be a natural way to lose the farm-allocation
ability—something we indeed cannot see in established mito-
chondrial dynamics. If the farm autonomously grows within the
host, allocation becomes a neutral trait (SI Appendix, Fig. S9). Our
results specifically show that there is no real need for an allocation
mechanism at all from the host’s side: any process that serves to
delay digestion up to the point where the symbiont can reproduce
is sufficient. Furthermore, we found that when symbionts provide
more benefit than what they inflict as cost on their host, and the
host receives more benefit than what it pays to feed its farm, then
maintaining the farm becomes more profitable than eating it
(SI Appendix, Fig. S12). Consequently, culling is abandoned when
the farm can provide more explicit benefit [e.g., photosynthate
(41), metabolite (42, 43), or ATP (11, 44)] than what the host
would receive by eating it. The route to synchronized cell cycles
opens up.
The farming hypothesis of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (7,
8) is a plausible scenario for the origin of mitochondria. Our
models provide strong support for the farming hypothesis and,
consequently, for the origin of mitochondria right after phagocy-
tosis and before any metabolic coupling, especially before the in-
vention of ANT. Our work explicitly tests a mitochondrial origin
hypothesis in a dynamical model, and is intended to bridge the gap
between telltale evolutionary scenarios and ecological assumptions
within the origin of eukaryotes. Our theory of mitochondrial origin,
as any other, has to explain the same questions raised previously
(3). Although our scenario does not explain all of the issues of
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eukaryogenesis (neither of the hypotheses do) (3), it provides a
plausible explanation for the early endosymbiotic relationship be-
tween partners (not just in the mitochondrial context) and the
emergence of relevant evolutionary innovations (farming, prudent
predation).
Materials and Methods
Analytical Minimal Model of Farming. We consider two predatory cell types:
nonfarmer and farmer. Farmers do not digest a fraction of ingested prey
during good times, and instead digest them when no prey is available in the
environment. Relative to the nonfarmer, the farmer enjoys a benefit during
prey scarcity by feeding on its prey stock, but suffers from a cost of slower
growth during prey richness. The dynamics during the growth period G is
_xðtÞ= axðtÞ− FðtÞ
k
xðtÞ, _yðtÞ=byðtÞ− FðtÞ
k
yðtÞ, [1]
where xðtÞ and yðtÞ are nonfarmer and farmer population densities at time t,
and a and b are respective Malthusian growth rates. Because of farming,
a>b. FðtÞ is the total production in the system and k is the carrying capacity
to which the total density relaxes. Prey density is not explicitly modeled. The
ratio zGðtÞ of farmer to nonfarmer after a period of tG can be solved
zGðtGÞ= yðtGÞxðtGÞ=
y0
x0
eðb−aÞtG . [2]
During prey scarcity there is only death (period D) no predation. Hence,
_xðtÞ=−dxðtÞ, _yðtÞ=− d   d0   e
rt
d +d0ðert − 1Þ yðtÞ. [3]
The initial death rate d0 of farmers is much less than d of nonfarmers. With
time, death rate of farmers converges to that of nonfarmers. We assume that
the increase in the death rate of farmers from d0 to d proceeds along a time-
dependent sigmoid curve, r affecting the shape of the sigmoid (SI Appendix,
Fig. S1). Both _xðtÞ and _yðtÞ have analytic solutions expressing population
densities at the end of a tD-long period D (SI Appendix). Their ratio is
zDðtDÞ= yðtDÞxðtDÞ=
y0
x0
edtD

1+
d0
d

ertD − 1
− dr
. [4]
After N cycles of G–D pair of periods, the ratio is
zN = z0½zGðtGÞzDðtDÞN = z0eNðdtD+ðb−aÞtGÞ

1+
d0
d

ertD − 1
−Ndr
, [5]
where tG and tD are the lengths of the growth and decline periods, re-
spectively, and z0 is the ratio at the start of the period. It is now straight-
forward to see when the farmer wins over its competitor: Fig. 1 shows zN,
the farmer/nonfarmer ratio after N G–D cycles. A concise condition for
lim
N→∞
zN > 1 is not known.
Farming, Fusion, and Fission.Wepresent a game theoreticalmodel here, and an
extension of the above minimummodel in SI Appendix, to model archaeal sex.
We follow the assumptions of the ecological minimal model above. There are
two predatory types: farmer and nonfarmer. In good periods, both types grow
exponentially, but only farmers can store living cells in phagosomes. In poor
times, there is only decay, and cells without farms starve to death. Fusion is
triggered by starvation: both types are of the same archaeal stock and can fuse
with each other. During fusion, they exchange cytoplasmic components, e.g.,
farmed cells, and then split. Because in the poor period there is no growth or
reproduction, we can ignore replicator dynamics for the game theoretical
model and assume iterated pairwise interactions. For the simplest case we
assume that when cells fuse, empty nonfarmers steal a fraction s of the stock
of their farming partners, who retain a fraction (1 − s) of their stock. The
below payoff matrix provides the average internal food levels (and average
payoffs) after first round of fusion–fission, where intact farmers can accumu-
late a farm of size f. It is easy to see that farmer is the evolutionarily stable
strategy in case of s≤½.
nonfarmer  ðdonorÞ farmer  ðdonorÞ
nonfarmer  ðrecipientÞ −q fs−q
farmer  ðrecipientÞ fð1− sÞ−q f −q
Individual-Based Computational Model. The resource input to the system is
provided by an abiotic resource function that directly defines the actual amount of
external prey. In every time step, a fixed amount of prey enters the system.Until the
population is fully updated, no newprey cells enter. Hence, there is competition for
them and they can be depleted in the given time step. The next time step will
introduce again a new batch of prey. With this simplification (i.e., assuming reg-
ulatedgrowth of prey species)we candirectly focus on the competitive dynamics of
the various predator types. Predators find external prey according to their density.
When they acquire prey, they either eat it and grow or (if able to farm) store the
prey for later processing. A predator can only ever consume a single prey per turn.
Thismeans that the farmeronlyeats a farmedprey item if it cannot finda free-living
prey in that turn. In contrast, if a farmer captures an external prey, it will not cull its
farm, regardless of whether it has consumed or farmed the captured prey. Farmed
bacteria are not essential for the farmers: if there is no farm, they can live the same
life as the nonfarmer predators (with a small decrease in fitness due to the
maintenance cost of the farming apparatus). Any eaten prey increases the internal
growth state of the predator. When the growth state reaches split size, the cell
inevitably splits to two. A farm’s inherent growth is implicitly modeled to avoid
complicated individual updating of prey populations within host populations.
The population of predators is limited and closed, to keep dynamics at bay.
Competition is modeled as a Moran process where reproducing individuals
produce a singlenewoffspring that replaces another individual in thepopulation.
This way, types with faster growth rates will overpopulate those with lower
growth rates. Predators able to farmmust pay costs. The baseline cost comes from
maintaining the apparatus of farming and does not depend on the number of
farmed cells. The farm-dependent cost explicitly depends on the size of the farm:
the bigger the farm is, the more the host must pay. Costs are deducted from the
hosts’ internal growth state to slow down its reproduction rate (explicit benefit,
if present, is added to the growth state). When a predator splits, a daughter cell
is generated, which overwrites another existing cell in the population. Both the
parent’s and the daughter’s growth states are reset to zero and the farm is
randomly distributed among them according to binomial distribution. The
daughter cell inherits the parent’s evolutionary traits with mutations.
Evolution allows the fine-tuning of three traits. The farm allocation rate f
specifies the probability that an engulfed prey is allocated to the internal
farm instead of being consumed. The farm culling rate h specifies the
probability that the host digests its farm (instead of capturing free prey),
based on prey density. The explicit farming cost c specifies the direct cost or
benefit of the farm. For more details, parameter values, and pseudocode of
the model, see SI Appendix. To compare the individual based and analytical
models, see SI Appendix, Table S1.
Supplementary material containing extended materials and methods, ta-
bles, and figures is available in the online version of the paper (SI Appendix).
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